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Introduction
In recent years, the provision and consumption of services have been crucial to developed economies. This so-called tertiary sector accounts for large fractions of GDPs, and it employs a large portion of the labour force 1 . Changes in consumers' preferences for services (mobile calls, internet, bank accounts, and distribution chains) are not the only factor contributing to this growth. Manufacturing firms have been increasing their use of services in the production process. Traditional industrial sectors purchase services to implement production, sell output, to manage their financial activities. Services such as transport, retail, and telecommunications Despite these facts, little of the economic literature explicitly addresses services as inputs for the production process. In such a framework, it is important to consider the services' market structure. Within the traditional models of an industrial organisation, a concern arises when upstream and downstream sectors are characterised by different market powers (Gabszewicz and Zanaj, 2007) : the downstream profitability is harmed whether the competition in the upstream market is weak. Services and manufacturers are empirically observed to operate in two different competitive environments (Barba-Navaretti et al., 2006). Manufactured goods are usually involved in strongly competitive markets, while many service providers operate in monopolistic (energy) or protected (financial-or business-related activities) sectors 2 . While manufacturers are increasingly exposed to fierce competition (trade liberalisation), services are relatively more protected. Given that manufacturing firms employ services as inputs in the production process, the combination of both anti-competitive domestic regulation and protection against foreign competitors potentially weakens the competitive position of those domestic firms that rely on services as inputs. In the present paper, I analyse whether variations in the average degree of service competition affect the efficiency of downstream (manufacturing) firms through the provided inputs 3 .
Recently, Arnold et al. (2011) showed that services competition affects manufacturing firms' productivity in the Czech Republic. When service liberalisation occurred, foreign entry contributed to the improved performance of manufacturing sectors. The authors provide evidence that the liberalisation process had a relevant and positive impact for all manufacturers. Such an empirical relationship can be explained by several mechanisms. For example, tougher competition may stimulate firms to invest in R&D or to upgrade the quality of services provided (Aghion et al., 2006) . Similarly, high-performance inputs increase the efficiency of the production process (Amiti Konings, 2007) : these improvements will facilitate production and reduce operating costs in downstream manufacturing firms. Moreover, through competition, liberalisation stimulates an increase in the number of provided varieties; the expansion of the number of varieties used in production is a source of productivity growth in the case of imperfect substitution among inputs (Ethier, 1982) .
Compared with previous literature, the present paper provides two novel considerations.
First, a developed economy as France is the subject of the analysis while the other studies focus on developing countries or transition economies (e.g. Arnold et al. (2011) for Czech Republic; Fernandes and Paunov (2008) for Chile). In a developing country (or in a transition economy), a liberalization process usually impacts all economic sectors. In such a case, the economy is likely to observe service liberalisation and growth in manufacturer productivity, both due to the modernisation process. Such simultaneity can bias an analysis that relies on I-O matrices (as do the present and previous studies), making it difficult to disentangle the contribution of services competition from the pure productivity growth due to reallocation. The French data minimise such concerns because France has not recently experienced a wide and deep transformation of the economic system.
In addition, France is an interesting case study because of the relatively low level of services 3 The WTO argues that it is impossible for any country to prosper today under the burden of an inefficient and expensive services infrastructure. Producers and exporters of textiles, tomatoes or any other product will not be competitive without access to efficient banking, insurance, accountancy, telecoms and transport systems [...] . The benefits of services liberalisation extend far beyond the service industries themselves; they are felt through their effects on all other economic activities[...] WTO-GATS FactBook (2005).
2 competition. The OECD has estimated that services deregulation in France may generate gains in terms of economic efficiency: if France was to align its norms on regulation (specifically in the service sectors) to that of the least restrictive OECD countries 4 , over the subsequent ten years it would stand to gain an estimated net maximum annual extra growth of 1.41% (in terms of multi-factor productivity, i.e. MFP). Table 1 .1 shows the potential benefits due to an economic deregulation for the whole French economy. In particular, liberalisations in network services should increase benefits; therefore, the impact of competition in network industries (e.g. electricity, TLC, and transport) is carefully considered. The second novel aspect of this work is the methodology applied to measure the degree of competition with firm-level data. I show that the computed proxies (markups and others) are consistent with the underlying theoretical models; therefore, these indicators can be considered reliable approximations of both market structure and the strength of the services competition.
After aggregating markups, I-O matrices 5 (at NACE 2 digit) are used to link services with 4 The OECD claims that the liberalisation of network industries in France lagged behind that of other large continental countries. However, the first wave of French deregulation reforms have begun to produce positive externalities in terms of lower prices, more diversified supply, and improved quality, and it has had an impact on economic activity. Source: OECD (2001). 5 Even if efficiency is measured at a firm level, it is important to observe that I-O coefficients (at NACE 2 digit) provide a macroeconomic interpretation of the results: the empirical results show how variation in the average degree of competition affects the average productivity of manufacturers. manufacturing sectors. Then I define the firm-level productivity of manufacturers as residual of a production function, and I perform a short-run analysis in which a firm's productivity depends on the services competition level: in particular, the empirical analysis exploits the role of network services as input providers.
This paper contributes to the recent literature on services' liberalisation process in terms of both methodology and policy conclusions. First, I provide evidence that a reduction in the average services' markup has a positive impact on manufacturing productivity. In the preferred econometric result, it is shown that a reduction of one standard deviation 6 of the average markup increases the average manufacturer efficiency by 1.5%. Second, I identify heterogeneous responses of firms from variations in services competition. The magnitude of the effect depends on the relative size and initial efficiency of a firm; in the short-run, smaller and less efficient firms are harmed by a reduction of services competition. Finally, I show that the empirical relationship is determined by a specific sub-sample of services, network industries (energy, telecommunication, transport, etc.). The same qualitative conclusion may be drawn if competition indicators from the OECD are used (entry barrier index in network industries). According to OECD (2001), an increase in competitive pressure can potentially produce benefits in terms of efficiency growth for the whole economy (Table 1 .1). This paper concludes that a negative correlation exists between manufacturers efficiency and the competition in services; thus, policies in favour of services competition (and in particular network industries) have effects far beyond the service sectors themselves.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. In Section 3, I
describe the data, competition indicators, and efficiency measures for both services and manufacturers. Section 4 illustrates the empirical strategy and discusses issues with the estimations. In Section 5, I report the estimation results, and in Section 6 I perform robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
6 One standard deviation unit over the mean for network services.
2 Literature
The role of inputs as factors influencing a firm's efficiency has been widely analysed. Amiti and Konings (2007) provide evidence that the productivity of Indonesian manufacturing firms increased when taxes on imports were reduced. Given that imported goods are used as inputs, a 10 percentage point decrease of the import tariff increases firms' productivity by 12%; a variety of expansion and substitution effects are identified as the main mechanism of transmission.
Moreover, an import tariff reduction has a larger impact on productivity than does an output tariff reduction. Similarly, Forlani (2009) finds, for a sample of Irish firms, that imports' intensity is a source of productivity growth, and in particular, that the effect is more significant for the less efficient firms.
The theoretical modelling of I-O linkages (and productivity growth) is more challenging. the effect is determined by a firm's markup.
Unlike the previous literature, the present paper is focused on firm-level manufacturing productivity. The empirical strategy is partially similar to other applied research on cross-market linkages; however, there are differences in terms of the analysed sector (manufacturing) and ag- 
Data Analysis
To estimate the empirical relationship between manufacturing efficiency and services competition, both firm and sector-level data are employed (sources in Tab. A.1). I separate service-sector data from manufacturing data because each group involves different issues related to estimation. First, I describe the service-sector data with relative competition proxies; then I describe the data for manufacturing sectors and the corresponding productivity measures.
Service data
Service-sector data are collected at both the firm level and the sector level (NACE 2 power, that is, the firm's capacity to charge higher prices for a given demand. In an imperfectcompetition framework, a firm sets a price above its marginal cost 11 . The DLW methodology is based on a cost minimisation problem for variable inputs without adjustment costs (materials), and markup is defined as the ratio of price to marginal cost (p/c). The output elasticity to input is related to the share of input's expenditure in total sales and a firm's markup as follows:
where β X it is the output elasticity to input X (i.e. materials). To estimate markup, it is necessary to recover output elasticity from the estimation of a production function and to calculate (from micro-level data) the share of input X in total sales (P Q it ). Such methodology is based on the control function approach developed by Olley Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn Petrin In the present paper, I interchangeably use liberalisation and deregulation to describe policies designed to change market structure, i.e. to raise the competition level.
10 A similar approach has been developed by Martin (2010) . 11 Under the assumption of a downward sloping demand curve. 12 Implicitly, it is assumed that deflated sales are considered a measure of physical quantity. In the context of markup estimation, the omitted price variable bias is not a concern, given that we are not interested in a reliable 8 capital (k). The Cobb-Douglas production function in three inputs is preferred for two reasons.
First, it allows for the use of material as a free adjustable input in the estimation of markups (our measure of interest): labour seems a priori less flexible as an input for a rigorous estimation of µ. Second, a translog function in three inputs, albeit flexible, requires the estimation of too many parameters (10) . A material demand function is used to proxy the unobserved productivity shocks (ω it ); the markets share for the principal NACE 4 market is included as an additional control for the input demand function 13 . The first stage of DLW is similar to ACF, and it requires the estimation of following equation in logs:
where φ is a complex (polynomial) function of inputs and market share. In the first stage it is not possible to identify either the coefficients of labour and capital (state variables) or the coefficient of material (proxy function), whereas the expected output ( φ it ) and residuals ( it ) are recovered. Production function coefficients are estimated in the second stage by assuming that unobserved productivity follows an autoregressive law of motion (ω it = g(ω it−1 ) + ξ it ). Using
is regressed non-parametrically on its lags, and the estimates of coefficients are obtained through unexpected productivity shocks ξ(β it ) with the following moment condition:
In Eq. 3.3, it is assumed that the amounts of capital and labour are decided one period ahead measure of productivity. However, the omitted price bias will underestimate the markups (De Loecker Warzynski, 2012), but it will not impact the relationship between the average markup in services and manufacturing productivity. 13 In DeLoecker Warzynski (2012), export status is used as control variable. The control function approach requires that demand function of input (material) be monotonic in productivity, i.e. an invertible function. According to the author, the monotonicity of intermediate inputs in productivity holds under a large class of models of imperfect competition.
(state variables), implying that l it and k it are not correlated with contemporaneous productivity shocks ξ it . Given that material is the free adjustable input (the current material level reacts to shocks in productivity), the m it coefficient is identified through its lagged value 14 . A standard GMM technique is used to retrieve the production function's coefficients for each NACE 2 market (with bootstrapped standard errors). Finally, it is possible to calculate markups from the material coefficient (β m , i.e. elasticity of output to material), and the cost share of material (corrected by the residual of first stage, it ). More precisely, the estimated markup µ of service provider i in sector j at time t is
where exp( it ) is used to control for variations in a firm's output due to variations in the input demand generated by input prices, productivity, technology parameters, and market characteristics such as the elasticity of demand and income levels (i.e. terms uncorrelated with φ it (.)). It 
where the financial cost is capital depreciation with a rate of 8% (Aghion et al., 2006) . For the empirical analysis, it is necessary to calculate the average markup for the NACE 2 digit market; thus firm-level observations (Eq. 3.4 or Eq. 3.5) have to be aggregated. Next, consider markup µ: I define the average market power in sector j as follows:
where w ijt is firm's weight, defined as market share 16 in the first NACE 4 market for firm i.
Then, the average markup for a NACE 2 market j (M P (µ) jt ) is calculated as the mean of average markups across the N (j) NACE 4 markets. As long as M P (µ) jt increases, the average market power increases (by construction), and the average competition level decreases: in section 3.1.3, I show that M P (µ) jt is a reliable indicator for the degree of competition (and similarly the average of the Lerner index, M P (l) jt ).
Additional competition indicators
Additional types of indicators are used in the empirical analysis to test the robustness of the results. First, I calculate the index for the market concentration level and an indicator for heterogeneity in firms' size. The concentration level in a two-digit market is defined by the C5 index 17 , namely the sum of the first five market shares for a given pair sector-year. Differently level) is calculated for the markup µ, which is obtained from a parametric estimation (Roeger, 1995) that controls for time variations and economies of scale (Dobrinsky et al., 2006) . These two indicators provide the same qualitative results of the present version. 16 Given that input output matrices are defined at a 2 digit level, it is necessary to calculate proxies at the same level of aggregation. However, I define the weighted average at NACE 4 to take into account markup heterogeneity across markets. I calculate market share as the ratio of firm revenues to market revenues in a 4 digit market; market size is defined as the sum of firms' revenues (from Amadeus). Different aggregation systems or a different market size definition (market size from OECD Stan) does not change the results. 17 A similar concentration index is the Herfindahl index, i.e. the sum of the squared value of market shares for all firms in a market. However, in the present case the Herfindahl index gives rise to doubt concerning its validity from Eq. 3.6, market size in terms of revenues (deflated) is calculated at a 2 digit level by using the OECD Stan dataset, so that market shares are the ratio of domestic revenues (from Amadeus) to the corresponding market size. The C5 for sector j at time t is
Competition is expected to decrease whether concentration increases. However, it is not obvious that high concentration provides evidence of low competition, given that a market can simultaneously be highly concentrated and highly competitive. In a simple duopoly (a lá Bertrand), strong competition may exist even if the concentration level is high; alternatively, the existence of sunk costs requires a minimum concentration for which it is convenient to remain in the market.
Given the importance of sunk costs, I introduce an additional indicator of competition that takes into account the existence of entry barriers and economies of scale. The minimum efficient scale (MES) at NACE 2 is defined at industry level j as follows:
The parameter M ES jt is the ratio of the average value added for the larger firms (those accounting for top 50% of the industry value added, AV jt ), to the average value added for the smaller firms 18 (AV jt ). MES approximates the dimensional heterogeneity of an industry (NACE 2): the higher the index is, the greater are the differences in size between large and small firms.
In addition, MES is a proxy for the optimal firm's dimension: a large MES value indicates that a new firm has to be large to be successful in the market. In other words, the higher the value of MES is, the higher are the sunk costs associated with entry into the market (Maioli et al., 2006) .
However, MES can be plagued by regulation (in the sense that regulation prevents firms from entering in the market) and generates higher value added. Thus, MES may result large while in fact MES is much lower because of entry restriction.
due to the absence of entire firms' populations; small firms are not included in the Amadeus sample, so all market shares are not available. 18 I rank firms according to value added (by year and sector), and then I calculate the total value added by industry. Next, I define the marginal firm that contributes 50% of the industry's value added, and I use it as threshold. Finally, I calculate the averages for firms ranked above AV , and below AV of the marginal firm. The averages are weighted with market shares similarly to Eq. 3.7.
To test the robustness of C5 and MES, I introduce into the empirical specification an indicator that measures the degree of entry barriers for network industries (i.e. energy, TLC, and transport services). Such an index (with others) is reported 19 by the OECD (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006) , and it has been used to assesses the impact of services competition on efficiency in a cross-country analysis (Bourlés et al., 2011) . A decrease in the index implies that entry barriers in network industries have been reduced because of deregulation (Tab B.5).
Finally, I take into account additional controls, which are indirectly related to services competition. First, I define the average efficiency to control for spillover effects (backward) in the I-O analysis (Javorcik, 2004) . As mentioned before, the production function for services is suitable to obtain a good estimate of µ, but it does not allow us to recover a reliable measure of productivity because of an unobserved price bias (De Loecker Warnzinsky, 2012). Thus, productivity is calculated by using a numerical index: the numerical indices (such as the Tornqvist index) are commonly employed to assess firm's efficiency in service sectors, and in particular in network industries (Coelli et al., 2003) . Consider ln Y it , S if t , and ln X if t to be, respectively, the log of the output for firm i, the input type-f as a share of total revenues, and the inputs' consumption; the overbarred terms are the weighted means (at NACE 4 j) for the corresponding firm-level variables. Then, the efficiency index (Aw et al., 2001) for firm i at time t in sector j is defined as
The efficiency index derives from a translog production function, and the considered inputs are tangible fixed assets, labour (labour force), and materials; then, the variable Index is aggregated as weighted mean for each service sector j (as Eq. 3.6 to consider heterogeneity across sectors).
Efficiency from Eq. 3.9 has two appealing characteristics: (i) it does not imply any assumptions concerning market structure and (ii) it implies a functional form (compared to a Cobb-Douglas in three inputs), which is preferable when dealing with heterogeneous firms 20 .
As 
Indicators' reliability
In the previous sections, I described different indicators for services competition. It is crucial for the empirical analysis to show that the provided indicators are related to the services market structure. Next, I provide evidence that elucidates the relationship between indicators, services competition, and market structure.
Two mechanisms characterise with a certain regularity the observed market structure (Sutton (1991). First, price competition is linked to the degree of market concentration for a given market. Second, firms tend to differentiate products to increase consumers' willingness to pay through R&D activity. Depending on the assumptions concerning the products' characteristics (homogeneous vs. differentiated) and competition type (e.g., Bertrand, Cournot, or monopoly), it is possible to observe different interactions between the degree of concentration, price competition, and market size 22 .
Because the empirical strategy is based on I-O coefficients, I provide descriptive statistics 20 Other measures such as labour productivity (value added per worker) are misleading. Any improvement may be generated by an increase in the value added due to an abuse of a dominant position, rather than to improvement in the efficiency.
21 Nonetheless, it is not possible to know a priori whether more FDIs raise or shrink the degree of competition in a given industry. FDI may encourage services competition through the presence of new firms; otherwise, foreign competitors may enter directly like an oligopolist, replacing local firms or creating a cartel with the national incumbent (Vandenbussche and Veurglers 1999). In this case, liberalisation policies to encourage FDI in services have not a positive effect on the competition level because a dominant position can be created by new incumbents who prioritize profits over social welfare. 22 It is important to remember that the estimated µ is robust to different types of market conduct (Bertrand, Cournot, monopoly).
14 for a two-digit market; in particular, I show how firms' mass (Source: Alissee) and market size (OECD Stan) are correlated with indicators of competition and the average capital intensity for intangible assets (IK is intangible capital to labour force and is a proxy of R&D expenditure). Given that a large part of empirical analysis is focused on network industries, it is important to devote attention to them (Section C), in particular to market power, making a comparison with indicators of regulation from the OECD. During the period of analysis (1996 to 2004), regulation has decreased in France, in particular in the electricity, gas, post, and telecommunications sectors; Table B .5 shows that entry barriers, public ownership, and vertical integration has been reduced over time. The deregulation process is the result of the implementations of EU directives on competition. In line with OECD analysis, the average market power decreases over time across all service sectors (Tab.B.2). However, the market power index (Col. 1, M P (µ)) shows a bell-shaped 
where M P mt measures the effect of average market power in services on manufacturing industry m. The empirical model aims to estimate the effect of variations in the degree of services competition on manufacturing firms' productivity. The marginal effect of interest is given by β 1 , that is, the estimated impact of a variation in competition (M P ) on productivity (T F P ).
If a productivity indicator is not free of unobserved factors, the β 1 coefficient captures not only the effect of competition on TFP but also the effect of competition on the unobserved factors.
Assume that it is not possible to disentangle productivity from a firm's markup; in this case, the β 1 coefficient is given by
for a generic measure of competition (M P ). In this case, it is not possible to identify the effect of competition on technical efficiency (ω) from the effect on a firm's markup (µ); there is the risk of overestimating the effect of services' market power because M P also affects the markups of manufacturing firms. The same argument can used for other unobserved factors such as output price or input (services) consumption; in the former case, β 1 is biased by the effect of services competition on output price, while in the latter case, the bias depends on variations in the use of services due to upstream competition variation. In conclusion, the second term of Eq. 3.11 does not allow us to recover reliable estimates.
To solve these problems, the production function is estimated by again following the DLW (2012) methodology to disentangle efficiency from markups. In contrast to the methods applied in Section 3.1.1, here I consider a Cobb-Douglas production function in two inputs (labour and capital), while material still defines the proxy function 28 ; obviously, the coefficient for material is not estimated, and labour is considered the free adjustable input (as in to Olley and Pakes, 1996) so that it is instrumented with its lag in the second stage. In addition, the chosen functional form allows us to address concerns regarding an unobserved output price and services consumption 29 , because they do not enter into the residuals calculation. By following the estimation procedure illustrated in section 3.1.1, I recover TFP and markup for a firm-year pair. The TFP is the measure of a firms technical efficiency, and it is the dependent variable for main estimated equation (4.2); markup µ is used as an additional control. 28 The implicit assumption of Cobb-Douglas is that factor elasticities remain constant over time, as do inputoutput coefficients. A translog production function forces us to assume variable elasticities. The production function is estimated at NACE 2, for which value added is the dependent variable. The ratio of export value to total revenues is used as additional control in the proxy function (as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) 29 In addition material is deflated using a price index which is calculated as a weighted average of manufacturing output deflators. Material deflator for a firm in sector m is defined as
where (def lnt) is the output deflator of (manufacturing) sector n at time t. As weights, I consider a transformation of input-output coefficients. The coefficient amn is "rescaled" between two manufacturing sectors m and n, i.e. amn is the ratio of inputs' purchase of sector m in manufacturing sector n to the total amount of inputs' purchase of sector m.
Empirical Strategy
To link competition measures (described in section 3) to downstream manufacturing productiv- It is assumed that a firm's average input mix does not change within the period, so that α mj is considered a reliable mean. If time variant coefficients were used in Eq. 4.1, it would have not been possible to disentangle the effects of competition on productivity from changes in the inputs' mix (changes in the α s), given that services' consumption is not observed at a firm level.
Moreover, the assumption of constant I-O coefficients is consistent with the production function from a short-run perspective: Cobb-Douglas in two inputs implicitly considers a fixed technology of production.
Productivity Equation
To determine the effect of a variation in the average degree of services competition on manufacturing efficiency, I estimate the following empirical model: Instead,μ(M ) measures the average markups in manufacturing industries; given that the majority of inputs are still purchased from other manufacturing sectors 31 , it is necessary to control for the average market power in the other input markets, and a control for manufacturing markup is defined similarly to that for services 32 (Eq. 3.6). All the regressors are taken with one 30 Given the lack of information about services' consumption at firm-level jointly with the use of an I-O matrix at NACE 2, β 1 has to be interpreted as the effect of a variation in the average degree of services competition on the average manufacturing productivity. 31 On average, 75% of inputs in manufacturers are manufactured. 32 In some sense I control for general equilibrium effects. Given that the market power of services potentially affects manufacturing market power, and that a firm's markup is statistically correlated with productivity (Daveri et al., 2010), withμ I allow for spillovers across manufacturers due to variation in the market power of services. lag period; it is assumed that adjustments in the degree of services competition affect manufacturing productivity with a one-period lag. Finally, the estimated model includes time dummies D t , sector dummies, and an i.i.d. error term it . The next step is to exploit the rich set of information which is available as panel data.
An advantage of employing firm-level data in panel form is that it is possible to control for cross-sectional differences in productivity using firms' fixed effects and to capture unobserved individual heterogeneity that could arise from firms' location, internal characteristics, or service use. In particular, fixed effects with time dummies are used to control for business cycles and changes in the economic policy (regional and national). I assume the existence of unobserved heterogeneity among the firms, and I redefine the error term as the sum of two components, one for a firm's time invariant characteristics h i , and one for the i.i.d. term η it ( it = h i +η it ). In this In the system-GMM estimator, I consider as endogenous variables 34 the lagged dependent and firm-level controls (output growth and capital intensity). Competition proxies and the sectorlevel control are considered exogenous; I assume that a single manufacturing firm cannot affect the average market structure in either services or in manufacturing (by definition the error term 33 Briefly, the system GMM is composed by a system of two equations, one in first-difference as in the standard GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) , and a second set of additional moment conditions in levels. In the difference equation, variables in first difference are instrumented with lagged values in levels, while for the equation in levels, the variables are instrumented with lagged values in first difference. In other words, the moments in the difference GMM approach are augmented by another set of moment conditions (assuming that the stationarity assumption for the initial condition holds). The system GMM by Blundell Bond (1998) provides a more efficient estimator if the autoregressive term of the dependent variable (β 0 ) is close to one, but the time series of TFP is not stationary (E(T F P i0 |c i = 0)). If a simple OLS is estimated for the current level of TFP on its past value, I find a β 0 close to 0.95. 34 An unbalanced panel is considered with Roodman routine (2006). The balanced panel is used in the robustness checks section. Endogenous variables are instrumented from the third lag: lags used as instruments do not change across different specifications. Earlier lags are correlated with the error term, according to Hansen-Sargan test for over-identification. Table B .6 provides the list of variables and instruments.
is at firm-level). In addition, the definition of sector variables as weighted averages (Eq. 4.1) attenuates the endogeneity concerns: the validity of the assumption is confirmed by statistical tests (Hansen-Sargan).
Finally, two specification tests are used to check the validity of the GMM estimator. First, the error term (excluding the fixed-effect component) must be serially uncorrelated. Arellano Bond test statistics (1991) checks the validity of this hypothesis: under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, the first differences of the error term must be serially uncorrelated with errors of order two. Second, the Hansen-Saragn test of over-identifying restrictions analyses the joint validity of instruments in the case that number of instruments is larger than number of endogenous variables. Columns one and two report the results for OLS and the fixed effect estimator, respectively.
Empirical Results
As expected, the sign of M P (µ S ) is negative: an increase in the average markup of services is associated with a lower manufacturing productivity in both the OLS and FE models. In the other columns, the system GMM estimator is implemented. Even if I control for unobserved heterogeneity at firm level, a negative and statistically significant correlation between services market power and manufacturing efficiency still exists, and thus an increase in the markups (not significant), concentration (C5 Table 5 .1 cannot be reliable, given that they aggregate highly different industries.
Therefore in the next step, I focus the analysis on a particular group of services: networks.
The network industries are characterised by huge fixed costs and are highly regulated compared to other sectors. Moreover, network industries offer an interesting case study given that several EU directives were focused on market competition in network industries. In particular, France has been characterised by a strong level of regulation, and low degree of competition in these industries (OECD, 2001), even if regulation in electricity and TLC has been reduced (Tab. B.5) in compliance with EU directives. Additionally, firm-level data for network industries are more representative of the entire population, in comparison with data from other services composed of many small firms 39 . For these reasons, network industries seem an interesting case to analyse (a more accurate discussion about network industries in France is in Section C). With this transformation it is possible to compare the magnitude of coefficients, and is thus possible to observe that a one standard deviation increase in MP(µ) has a larger impact on manufacturing productivity compared to the same variation in M ES (from Table 5 Finally, FDI intensity always has a positive effect on manufacturing efficiency, indeed larger than a comparable reduction in the competition indicators: however FDI includes several effects due to services as backward spillovers or competitive pressure from foreign investors, which are not possible to disentangle. Besides, efficiency growth in services has always a positive spillover effect on the average manufacturing productivity. By comparing the marginal effects of Table 5 .1 (reporting only system GMM results) and Table 5 .2, it is observed that the magnitude of the effect has increased. These results strongly suggest that the average downstream efficiency is mainly affected by network industries. In the last part of Table D.1, I show the results of estimating Eq. 4.2, using Olley and Pakes productivity (1996) as a dependent variable, and average indicators from network industries. As mentioned in section 3.2, in this case it is not possible to disentangle a firm's productivity from markups. It is possible to observe that marginal effects from Table D.1 are higher than those in Table 5 .2, confirming the effectiveness of the DLW approach in the present framework. If efficiency and markups (at firm-level) are not separately identified, the estimated coefficients can be biased. Given that it is not possible to separate the effect of competition on productivity from the effect on firm's markup, the estimated coefficient captures both phenomena and marginal effects result larger 41 in Table D. 1.
In conclusion, the results are consistent with the expectations of the OECD, according to which France benefits in terms of aggregate TFP from deregulation and liberalisation policies in favour of competition, in particular in network industries (Appendix C). Indeed, the positive effect from a reduction in entry barriers reinforces the findings. However, with the present analysis it is not possible to define an optimal level for indicators (i.e. competition level), given that the variables of interest are defined as weighted means across different service sectors; it is unknown whether the observed value of competition indicators are above or below an optimal value.
Moreover, it is difficult to define widely acceptable criteria according to which the competition level is optimal (maximise manufacturing firms' efficiency or consumer welfare). Thus, it hard to say how much the markup or the minimum efficiency scale must be reduced in each sector to maximise growth; what it is inferred is that services competition and manufacturing efficiency are negatively correlated, indicating that liberalisation and deregulation policies that encourage services competition have a positive effect far beyond services themselves.
Robustness check analysis
To test the robustness of previous findings, I estimate whether the characteristics of manufac- of firms' efficiency (T F P ) to the productivity frontier, by using as reference period year 1997; the distance variable is therefore time invariant. The frontier for the NACE 2 digit sector m is defined by the firm with the highest productivity level in 1997; the distance indicator is
where T F P is the De Loecker Warzinsky (2012) residual and max(T F P ) m1997 is the maximum level of efficiency observed in sector m (the frontier does not change in the sample period).
The variable Dist is defined between 0 and 1; a value of one indicates the most efficient firm, while values close to zero refer to laggard firms compared to the frontier firm. According to Eq. 6.1 firms are divided in four groups (25th, 50th, 75th percentile). In the first group (Ist) there are the less efficient firms (average efficiency= 5.60), that is, farther from the frontier, while the last group (IVth) includes the most efficient ones (average efficiency= 8.34) The results in table 6 .1 show that less efficient firms are on average more affected by variations in the average market markup of services (network), while firms above the median distance (IIIrd and IVth) are not hurt by an anti-competitive upstream market (the effect is still negative but not significant).
These results suggest that less efficient firms suffer more from an anti-competitive service sector, and the marginal effects in table 6.2 confirm the results. It interesting to note that the positive effect from FDI increases with the relative efficiency of a firm: the more efficient the firm is the larger are the benefits from FDI in services (still, it is difficult to say whether this effect is a pro-competitive effect or a type of backward spillover).
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 6 .1, I consider a balanced panel: equation 4.2 is estimated by considering firms that are observed in each year of the estimation's sample. In in column B1, competition is measured as usual by average markup, while in column B2 the entry barrier indicator (from the OECD) is employed. In both cases, a statistically significant and negative coefficient is reported (as expected). Increases of one standard deviation in average markup and entry barriers are associated with a reduction in average productivity of 0.64% and 0.46%, respectively (Table 6. 2). Finally, marginal effects are larger than in the case of full sample (Tab. D.1), possibly suggesting that previous results were driven by the presence of laggard firms.
These results seem in contrast with those of Bourlés et al. (2011) , who detect negative effects for sectors close to the frontier; however, it is necessary to emphasise that the present approach firm's size. I again split the estimation's sample into two groups, one formed by large firms Table 6 .3. The MP(µ N ) coefficient suggests that medium-and small-sized firms suffer from a decrease of services competition; the marginal effects in Table 6 .2 confirm this intuition. In the subsequent four columns, I divide the estimation sample into four groups according to the quartiles of average firm employment. In the first group, there are firms with less than 37 workers on average, in second group between 38 and 64, in the third between 64 and 146, and in the last there are firms with more than 146 employees on average.
The median value is 64, so groups Ird, IInd, and IIIrd include almost all firms in column MedSm.
Very small firms (Ist) and medium-sized ones (IIIrd ) seem to be more harmed by an increase in services markup 43 . However, according to Table 6 .2, it is difficult to say that there exists a linear relationship between firm's size and the marginal effect of average markup, as in the case of distance to the frontier: regardless, small firms suffer a larger reduction in efficiency after an increase in the average services markup (compared to the last quartile). Finally, large firms seem to benefit from an increasing level of FDI intensity in services (Tab.6.2) compared to small ones.
The results reinforce the main hypothesis that variations in services competition have a relevant impact on manufacturing productivity: high levels of market power in network industries are associated with lower efficiency for manufacturing firms. In particular, small and less-efficient firms are more hurt by a reduction in services competition, and thus the competitiveness of weak firms depends also on the conduct in other markets (services). In conclusion, more competition in service sectors can foster productivity growth in other industries and improve the competitiveness of the whole economy. 
Conclusions
Despite the increasing role of services as inputs for manufacturing process, little attention has been devoted to understanding whether the services market structure (competition) affects the efficiency of manufacturing firms. On the one hand, services account for an increasing proportion of inputs used by manufacturing firms. On the other hand, the degree of competition in large part of the services sector differs from the competitive pressure in the manufacturing sector.
While services operate in highly regulated and protected markets (in particular network industries), manufacturers are often exposed to global competition due to trade liberalisation; even if the recent statistics on trade in services show an increase in the volumes (Ariu and Mion, 2011), trade in manufactured goods is still more relevant to determining the market structure and firms' behaviour. Therefore, such asymmetry may harm manufacturing firms' performances, especially for those that rely more intensively on service inputs. This paper answers some of these questions by providing evidence on how variations in services competition affect manufacturing efficiency.
In particular, the analysis focuses on the most crucial service sectors (network industries) and 
A Data Description
Sector list, in parentehesis NACE 2 digit code. System GMM estimator: one step estimator is used. TFP is the dependent variable: it is the residual calculated from the estimation of production function in 2 inputs (Olley Pakes, 1996) . Each column represents a different regression. Firm level control are not reported. Year dummies included. Robust standard errors are clustered at NACE 4 and are reported in brackets. Significance level: * is the p-value>0.1, ** is the p-value>0.05, and *** is the p-value>0.01 . Instr.: total number of instruments. For the Hansen test (over-identification test) and AR2 test are reported the p-values.
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